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CAN A LEOPARD CHANGE HIS SPOTS?: 
CHILD CUSTODY AND BATTERER’S INTERVENTION 
KRISTINA C. EVANS* 
John and Kathy were married and had a daughter, Mary Elizabeth.1  Both 
parents loved their daughter dearly.  Although he never laid a hand on his 
daughter, John continuously battered his wife.2  After two protective orders 
failed to stop the abuse, Kathy sought a divorce.3  Not surprisingly, a bitter cus-
tody battle ensued.  Despite Kathy’s insistence that John’s violence should pre-
vent him from having custody or visitation, the court granted John unsuper-
vised visitation every other weekend, one Monday per month, and three hours 
every Tuesday.4  After one such visit, Kathy became worried when John did not 
return three-year-old Mary Elizabeth on time, so she sought police assistance.  
Upon investigation, police discovered John and Mary Elizabeth in John’s truck 
in the garage at his home.  Both were dead of gunshot wounds; John’s gun was 
found in the truck.5  John had taken anger management classes.6 
Although this story is an extreme example of what can happen if a batterer 
is given unsupervised visitation with his child,7 it anecdotally disproves the all-
too-common view of courts that interspousal violence has little to do with par-
enting ability and thus, merits little consideration in custody decisions.  Hope-
fully, attitudes will continue to change in recognition of the effects such abuse 
actually has on children. 
Clearly, interspousal abuse is a hazard to victims during the relationship.  
What courts may fail to realize is that it continues to be a hazard to child wit-
nesses and to victims even after the relationship has been legally dissolved.  
Children who witness interspousal violence often experience emotional difficul-
ties, including anxiety, depression, increased aggression, and even Post Trau-
 
 * J.D. , Duke University School of Law, expected May 2004; A.B., Princeton University.  I 
would like to thank the Journal staff, especially Jill Martin and Montaye McGee, for all their hard 
work in editing this note. 
 1. See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Ultimate Revenge in Custody Battles, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2002, at C7. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Deborah Kadin, 2 Dead in Apparent Murder-Suicide, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 3, 2002, at 
News 4. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id.  Although anger management classes are not necessarily specifically designed for batter-
ers, the fact that John had received some treatment still makes this story relevant to the topic of this 
note. 
 7. Throughout this note, I will refer to the victims as "she" and batterers as "he."  While it is 
true that women may also abuse men, all of the court cases and studies of batterer programs that I 
cite in this note involve male batterers and female victims. 
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matic Stress Disorder.8  Exposure to interspousal violence during childhood may 
also lead to involvement in family violence later in life.9  Children in homes 
where interspousal abuse occurs are also at a much greater risk of being physi-
cally abused themselves.10  Unfortunately, for victims, divorce is not always the 
end of the violence.  On the contrary, separation often escalates the abuse, and 
joint custody and unsupervised visitation may give abusers ample opportunity 
to continue abusing their former spouses.11  In addition, even if the violence be-
tween the former spouses ends after divorce and/or after courts make custody 
arrangements designed to minimize the contact between the victim and the 
abuser, there is always the risk that the children will continue to be exposed to 
interspousal violence if the batterer becomes involved in a new relationship.12 
In response to the growing body of knowledge about the dynamics of  in-
terspousal violence and its effects on children, courts have begun considering 
interspousal violence in custody decisions.13  Custody statutes in most states 
specifically list interspousal violence as a factor to be considered in custody de-
cisions.  In some states, there is even a rebuttable presumption that a batterer 
should not be awarded custody.14  So, what is a batterer to do if he still wants 
 
 8. Kendell Segel-Evans, Wife Abuse and Child Custody and Visitation by the Abuser, ENDING 
MEN'S VIOLENCE NEWSLETTER (Fall 1989), available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/warters/ 
warterse.htm (last visited May 5, 2003). 
 9. Some estimate that thirty percent of children who witness interspousal violence become 
abusive parents.  Michele Westerlund, Abusive Parents and Physical Placement Awards: What More 
Could Wisconsin Do to Protect its Children?, 16 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 296 (2001) (citing Report on Do-
mestic Violence: A Commitment to Action, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 334 (1993)); see also H.R. Con. Res. 
172, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted) ("[R]esearch into the intergenerational aspects of domestic violence 
reveals that violent tendencies may be passed on from one generation to the next."). 
 10. David Pelcovitz & Sandra J. Kaplan, Child Witnesses of Violence Between Parents, 3 CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 745, 749-50 (1994).  It is estimated that between 30% 
and 60% of batterers who physically abuse their spouses also physically abuse their children and 
that children who are exposed to interspousal abuse are 129% more likely to be abused themselves.  
Id. 
 11. See Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases: Legal 
Trends, Research Findings, and Recommendations, APPLIED RESEARCH FORUM, NATIONAL ELECTRONIC 
NETWORK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1, 3, at http://www.vawnet.org/VNL/library/general/ 
AR_custody.html (last visited May 5, 2003) (noting that "[s]eparation is a time of increased risk of 
homicide for battered women . . . and these homicides sometimes occur during custody hearings or 
visitation exchanges of children").  For a chilling account of a woman murdered by her ex-husband 
when he came to pick up the children for visitation, see the introduction to Westerlund, supra note 9, 
at 287-88.  A Canadian study found that a quarter of women who had divorced their abusers had 
their lives threatened by their ex-husbands during custody visitations.  Richard M. Tolman & Jeffrey 
L. Edleson, Intervention for Men Who Batter: A Review of Research, in UNDERSTANDING PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS 262, 266 (S.R. Stith & M.A. Straus 
eds., 1995), available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/toledl.htm (last visited May 5, 2003). 
 12. See Saunders, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that more than half of male batterers will later abuse 
another victim). 
 13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (Michie 2003).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
types of statutes providing for a consideration of interspousal violence in custody decisions, see 
Parts I & II, infra. 
 14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2003).  Again, a more detailed discussion of such statutes can 
be found in Parts I & II, infra. 
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more visitation with his children?  Batterer’s intervention programs15 are one op-
tion for treatment of abusive men, and in custody cases courts may look more 
favorably on men who have completed such programs.16  But how effective are 
such programs?  Can a court rely on a batterer’s completion of such a program 
to demonstrate that he is “cured” of his violent tendencies? 
This note examines the current state of research investigating the effective-
ness of such programs in an effort to determine the weight such programs 
should be afforded in custody decisions.  Part I provides a brief overview of the 
history of custody law and the part interspousal violence plays in custody deci-
sions.  Part II looks at the way courts use batterer’s interventions in the context 
of custody determinations.  Part III discusses what the interventions are, and 
Part IV examines current research on the effectiveness of such programs.  Fi-
nally, Part V provides recommendations for courts based on this research. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CUSTODY LAW AND THE ROLE OF 
 INTERSPOUSAL VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY DECISIONS 
In colonial times, children were treated as the property of their fathers.17  
Gradually, as childhood became romanticized, nurture became an important 
goal, and as women gained some legal independence from their husbands, the 
presumption of paternal custody began to shift to the “tender years” doctrine, 
preferring the mother as nurturer.18  In the last thirty years, however, all of this 
has changed;19 statutes have become gender neutral and courts have even gone 
so far as to hold that a maternal preference is unconstitutional.20 
Today, the predominant doctrine in custody law is the “best interests of the 
child” standard.21  In addition, in the past twenty or so years, a new trend has 
developed as an extension of the “best interests” standard—a trend toward joint 
custody.22  This trend reflects the belief that children are better off if they main-
tain relationships with both parents.23  Much of this trend has been fueled by a 
strong fathers’ rights movement.24 
 
 15. In this note, the terms "batterer's intervention," "batterer's counseling," "batterer's treat-
ment," "batterer's program," and "batterer's group" will be used interchangeably to refer to programs 
for male batterers aimed at ending their violent behavior. 
 16. See, e.g., Riedel v. Campos-Riedel, No. C036947, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 8320 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 4, 2002) (unpublished opinion). 
 17. Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America, in 
FAMILY LAW 711, 711 (Leslie J. Harris & Lee E. Teitelbaum eds., 2000). 
 18. See id. at 712. 
 19. Kathy T. Graham, How the ALI Child Custody Principles Help Eliminate Gender and Sexual Ori-
entation Bias from Child Custody Determinations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 323, 324 (2001). 
 20. See, e.g., Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986). 
 21. See Leslie J. Harris & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Child Custody, in FAMILY LAW 711, 713 (Leslie J. Har-
ris & Lee E. Teitelbaum eds., 2000). 
 22. See id. at 784. 
 23. Id. (noting that some states even have statutes creating a preference for joint custody). 
 24. See, e.g., www.fathersrightsinc.com (featuring legal tips for fathers, including hints at how to 
get a lower child support settlement). 
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A preference for joint custody is particularly problematic for battered 
women.25  Joint custody frequently translates into continued contact between the 
abuser and the victim, which all too often means that divorce is no escape from 
the abuse suffered during the marriage.26  Together with a preference for joint 
custody, courts may apply “Friendly Parent” provisions, which prefer a parent 
who is willing to share custody to a parent who refuses to share.27  Again, this 
policy creates a dilemma for battered women—if they refuse to share custody 
for fear of future abuse, a court may see them as uncooperative and may punish 
them for it.28  Moreover, joint custody preferences may be used by abusers sim-
ply as a tool to further abuse their victims; even if they do not really want shared 
custody, they may use the threat of suing for joint or sole custody to gain more 
power over their victims.29 
The American Law Institute has gone a step further than the “best inter-
ests” standard and joint custody preferences by creating a primary caretaker 
rule as the basis for custody decisions.30  Under this rule, the custody arrange-
ment would reflect the child-care arrangements during the marriage; if the 
mother took care of the children most of the time, she would get primary physi-
cal custody of the children.31  This rule has some advantages that could help bat-
tered women.  The rule provides greater certainty in custody outcomes.32  This 
certainty could benefit battered women by reducing the ability of abusers to 
manipulate the highly discretionary “best interests” standard in order to gain 
power over their victims.  Hand in hand with increased certainty is the reduc-
tion of the finger-pointing that is frequently seen when the “best interests” stan-
dard is applied.  While the “best interests” standard seems to invite allegations 
of bad parenting, the primary caretaker rule relies on easily-ascertainable, objec-
tive evidence.33  Accordingly, for battered women, this means that their abusers 
may have less of an opportunity to psychologically abuse them with accusations 
of unfit motherhood.  It is yet to be seen whether states will accept or reject this 
rule. 
Recognizing the dilemma of battered women in custody proceedings, Con-
gress passed a joint resolution in 1990 encouraging states to create a rebuttable 
 
 25. See Leslie Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Parents' Duty to Support and 
Right to Control Their Children, in FAMILY LAW 562, 563 (Leslie J. Harris & Lee E. Teitelbaum eds., 
2000). 
 26. See Saunders, supra note 11, at 3. 
 27. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 2003) (providing that a court must consider 
"which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncusto-
dial parent"). 
 28. See, e.g., Riedel v. Campos-Riedel, No. C036947, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 8320, at *17  (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 4, 2002) (unpublished opinion). 
 29. See Westerlund, supra note 9, at 294. 
 30. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common Sense: From Tradi-
tional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute's Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 11, 19 
(2002). 
 33. See id. 
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presumption that batterers should not have custody of children.34  Fortunately, 
many states have heeded the call,35 and virtually all states now either require or 
specifically allow courts to consider interspousal violence in custody proceed-
ings.36  These statutes vary widely.  For example, some of the rebuttable pre-
sumption statutes apply only to considerations of joint custody,37 while others 
create a rebuttable presumption that neither sole nor joint custody should be 
given to a batterer.38  Some of the statutes that do not provide for a rebuttable 
presumption nonetheless require that interspousal violence be considered and 
that specific findings of fact be made if there is evidence of such violence,39 while 
others merely state that interspousal violence shall be considered.40  These stat-
utes also vary in that some simply allow or require that any interspousal vio-
lence be considered,41 while others require specific findings as to the effect of in-
terspousal violence on the children.42 
The rebuttable presumption statutes also vary widely in the amount of 
proof necessary to create the presumption.  Some statutes require either one se-
 
 34. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted) ("[F]or purposes of determining child cus-
tody, credible evidence of physical abuse of one's spouse should create a statutory presumption that 
it is detrimental to the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse."). 
 35. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2003), ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403 (2003), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-
101(c) (Michie 2002), CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2003), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (2002), D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(3(F) (2003), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 2002), HAW. REV. STAT. § 
571-46(9) (2003), IDAHO CODE § 32-717(B)(5) (Michie 2002), IOWA CODE § 598.413(1)(b) (2003), LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2003), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 31A (2003), MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2)(d) 
(2002), NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (2003), N.D. CEN. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j), OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 
112.2(2) (2003), OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)(d) (2001), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Michie 2002), 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (Vernon 2002), WIS. STAT. § 767.24(2)B)(2)(c) (2002).  Both Missouri 
and New Jersey have statutes that allow a rebuttable presumption against granting custody to a bat-
terer when a victim seeks a protective order.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050(5) (2003), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:25-29 (West 2003). 
 36. In addition to the statutes listed in note 35, supra, see ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (Michie 
2003), COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(1) (2002), GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(2)(2002), 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(6)-(7) (2003), IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8(7) (2003), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(3)(B)(vii) (2002), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(F) & (3) (Banks-Baldwin 2002), ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 19-A § 1653(6) (West 2003), MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1 (2002), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
722.23(3)(k) (2002), MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(2)(6), (13) (2003), MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(f) 
(2002), NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2)(d) (2002), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(II)(c) (2002), N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 2003), N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2003), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.2(a) (2003), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(1)(h) (Page 2002), 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5303(a)(3) 
(2002), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(g) (2002), S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1530 (Law. Co-op. 2002), TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a)(8) (2002), UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (2003), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
665(b)(9)(2003), VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(9) (Michie 2003), WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1)-(2) 
(2003), W. VA. CODE § 48-9-209(a)(3) (2003), W. VA. CODE § 48-9-209(a)(3) (2003), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
20-2-201(c) (2002). 
 37. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2)(d) (2002). 
 38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2003). 
 39. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(2)(6), (13) (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(C)(7) (Michie 2003). 
 41. See, e.g., IND. CODE  § 31-17-2-8(7) (2003). 
 42. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (providing that "[i]f domes-
tic violence and abuse is alleged, the court shall determine the extent to which the domestic violence 
and abuse has affected the child and the child's relationship to both parents"). 
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vere incident of violence or a pattern of violence.43  The presumption is only 
triggered in other statutes when there has been a criminal conviction for inter-
spousal violence.44 
Statutes in many states also provide that any impairment of the victim 
caused by the abuse shall not be considered in determining the child’s best in-
terests.45  Some statutes require courts to consider the safety of the victim in set-
ting out a visitation plan.46  Batterer’s intervention may or may not be mentioned 
in these statutes; its role in statutes and case law will be discussed in the next 
section. 
II.  HOW BATTERER’S INTERVENTIONS FIGURE IN CUSTODY DECISIONS 
Batterer’s interventions may come into play in custody decisions in one of 
three main ways.  First, they may be used as evidence to rebut the presumption 
that a batterer should not be given custody of the child.47  Second, visitation may 
be conditioned on completion of a batterer’s program.48  Third, batterer’s treat-
ment may simply be used as evidence in determining the best interests of the 
child when there is no rebuttable presumption law.49 
A. Rebutting Presumption Against Custody 
Completion of batterer’s counseling may be used as evidence to rebut the 
presumption against granting sole and/or joint custody to the batterer.  Some 
rebuttable presumption statutes even specifically mention batterer’s treatment.  
For example, Louisiana’s rebuttable presumption statute provides: 
[T]he presumption shall be overcome only by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the perpetrating parent has successfully completed a treatment  pro-
gram . . . , is not abusing alcohol and the illegal use of drugs . . . , and that the 
best interest of the child or children requires that parent’s participation as a cus-
todial parent because of the other parent’s absence, mental illness, or substance 
abuse, or such other circumstances which affect the best interest of the child or 
children.50 
Other statutes simply list completion of batterer’s intervention as a factor to be 
considered when determining whether the presumption has been rebutted.51 
Even when a statute does not specifically list batterer’s counseling, case law 
may establish it as evidence that can be used to rebut a presumption against a 
 
 43. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE  § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., S.C. CODE  ANN. §  20-7-1530 (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
 45. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE  § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2002) ("The fact that the abused parent suffers 
from the effects of the abuse may not be grounds for denying that parent custody."). 
 46. See, e.g., GA. CODE  ANN. § 19-9-1(a)(2)(A) (2002) ("The court shall consider as primary the 
safety and well-being of the child and of the parent who is the victim of family violence[.]"). 
 47. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2003). 
 48. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(C) (West 2003). 
 49. See, e.g., Millard v. Millard, 679 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2003). 
 51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(O)(2)(2003). 
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custody award to the batterer.52  For example, in Riedel v. Campos-Riedel,53 the 
completion of batterer’s counseling was used to rebut the presumption against 
giving custody to a batterer.  In this case, Donald, the father of Christian, had 
abused his ex-wife, Sophia, throughout their marriage and had even pled guilty 
to felony spousal abuse.54  At first, Sophia was awarded primary physical  cus-
tody and Donald was allowed unsupervised visitation.55  Later, however, after 
the court found that Sophia had been making reports of questionable validity to 
Protective Services that Donald had abused Christian, the court transferred pri-
mary physical custody to Donald.56  The court considered Sophia’s uncoopera-
tiveness and questionable allegations, as well as the fact that Donald had com-
pleted a batterer’s treatment program.57  Based on these factors, the court 
determined that the presumption against awarding Donald custody had been 
rebutted.58 
This case is upsetting for multiple reasons. First, the court initially pro-
vided for joint legal custody and unsupervised visitation for Donald, basically 
assuring contact between the two former spouses, despite the parents’ history of 
interspousal violence.59  Second, the court held that Donald had overcome the 
presumption against custody even though Sophia presented evidence that Don-
ald “continued to minimize and deny the abuse,” despite his “successful” com-
pletion of treatment.60  It is also compelling to note that Donald was convicted of 
felony spousal abuse nearly a year after he started treatment in a batterer’s inter-
vention program, further suggesting that his treatment was not successful.61  Un-
fortunately, it is unclear from the case whether he was convicted for incidents 
that occurred before, during, or after his treatment.  Nonetheless,  Riedel serves 
 
 52. Unfortunately, family law cases involving custody disputes are not often published.  The 
cases that are published are appeals from an earlier judgment, and since many cases are not ap-
pealed, it is difficult to tell how judges are actually using batterers' counseling in their decisions.  See 
Kim Susser, Weighing the Domestic Violence Factor in Custody Cases: Tipping the Scales in Favor of Pro-
tecting Victims and their Children, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875, 884 (2000).  The following case discussion 
is based on what little published case law the author was able to find.  For other cases that mention 
how batterer's treatment may be used to rebut the presumption against awarding custody to the bat-
terer, despite the fact that there was no evidence that the batterer in the particular case had com-
pleted such a program, see Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 165 n.6 (N.D. 1995) (discussing what is 
needed to rebut the presumption and noting that "[a]lthough treatment is not a fail-safe remedy, it 
may, in certain circumstances, support a finding that domestic violence is not likely to occur in the 
future"); Bruner v. Bruner, 534 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D. 1995) (affirming Heck v. Reed). 
 53. No. C036947, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 8320 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2002) (unpublished). 
 54. Id. at *4-5.  The court minimized the violence by describing it as "consist[ing] of mainly 
pushing and shoving, and one incident of hitting when Sophia suffered a minor cut on her finger."  
Id. at *4. 
 55. Id. at *6. 
 56. See id. at *7. 
 57. Id. at *5. 
 58. See id. at *24-33. 
 59. See id. at *5-6.  This may also explain Sophia's persistence in making questionable reports to 
Child Services.  She may have been looking for a way to avoid future contact with her former 
abuser. 
 60. Id. at *30.  Donald did testify that he was not a violent person, and the court found that to be 
an accurate statement since there was no evidence that he was violent outside of his marriage to 
Sophia.  Id. at *30 n.8. 
 61. See id. at *5-6. 
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as an example of a case in which batterer’s intervention was likely given more 
weight than it deserved. 
B. Condition of Visitation 
Visitation may also be conditioned on successful completion of batterer’s 
counseling.  One of the strictest statutes dealing with this situation is Louisiana’s 
rebuttable presumption statute.62  It provides that when a history of interspousal 
violence is found, “the court shall allow only supervised child visitation with 
that parent, conditioned upon that parent’s participation in and completion of a 
treatment program.”63  To be awarded unsupervised visitation, a batterer must 
not only complete treatment, but must also show an absence of substance abuse 
and establish that visitation is in the child’s best interest.64  Louisiana is stricter 
than most states in requiring completion of a batterer’s program before even su-
pervised visitation is allowed. 
Case law from other jurisdictions has made shared parental responsibility 
and supervised visitation contingent on the completion of a batterer’s program.65 
Additionally, state statutes often specifically allow a court to order completion 
of a batterer’s program if a history of interspousal violence is found and visita-
tion is awarded.66 
C. Best Interests Standard 
The third role batterer’s treatment plays in custody determinations is in the 
ascertainment of the child’s best interests.  For example, in Millard v. Millard,67 a 
New York case,68 the court denied the petitioner-mother a modification of a  
former custody decree.69  In justifying why the children’s best interests were 
served by remaining with their father, the court noted that, although the father 
had been convicted of interspousal violence in the past, he had completed an 
anger management program and thus posed no danger to the children.70 
Since batterer’s interventions clearly may play some role in custody deci-
sions, it is important to determine the weight they should be given.  The next 
 
 62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(C) (West 2003). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Coulter v. Coulter, No. 02-0473, 2002 WL 31528589, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 
2002) (conditioning visitation on completion of batterer's counseling and a statement from a psychia-
trist assuring that he was no longer a danger to his ex-spouse and children); Berger v. Berger, 795 So. 
2d 113, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (providing that the court would "consider expanding the shared 
parental responsibility" if the abusive father completed a batterer's program). 
 66. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31A (2003) (providing that a court must take into ac-
count the safety of both the child and the victim if visitation is awarded to the abuser, and that it 
may do so by ordering the completion of a batterer's program, among other things). 
 67. 679 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 68. In New York, there is no rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to an abuser, 
but interspousal violence is listed as a fact to be considered in determining the best interests of the 
child.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2003). 
 69. Millard, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 435. 
 70. Id. 
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sections shed light on this question by exploring what batterer’s interventions 
are and how effective they are in reducing or eliminating interspousal violence. 
III.  WHAT ARE BATTERER’S INTERVENTIONS?71 
This section explores what batterer’s interventions are, including what is-
sues are covered in programs, how the sessions are conducted, what it takes to 
successfully complete a program, and how programs are regulated by state 
standards.  Programs vary greatly, depending on the style of the group leaders, 
the theory behind the program content, the location, the amount of funding 
available, and many other variables.  Because of the recent promulgation of state 
standards for batterer’s programs in most jurisdictions, however, certified  pro-
grams are becoming somewhat more consistent in their approaches to treating 
batterers.72 
A. What is the Content and How are They Conducted? 
Batterer’s programs range between six and thirty-two weeks in duration.73  
Most programs described in batterer’s intervention literature employ some 
variation of either a cognitive-behavioral or social learning approach.74  These 
approaches involve components such as anger management training, communi-
cation skills, modeling, and relaxation.75  Other models include unstructured 
group therapy and a profeminist power and control model.76  Unstructured 
group therapy takes a psychotherapeutic approach to batterer’s treatment;77 the 
sessions are loosely-structured and are based on open discussions between the 
men in the group.  They focus on themes such as trust building, forgiveness, and 
developing positive attitudes.78  The profeminist power and control approach 
incorporates some cognitive-behavioral techniques, like cognitive restructuring, 
but focuses primarily on education.79  Profeminist power and control groups 
concentrate on feminist themes and demand that men in the group take respon-
sibility for their actions.80 
Batterer’s programs also vary in how they are staffed and in who attends.  
The profeminist power and control model requires groups to have two leaders, 
 
 71. Although couples counseling is sometimes considered as an option for treating male batter-
ers, the batterer's interventions discussed herein all involve all-male group therapy.  This treatment 
seems most appropriate in this context because we are dealing with batterer's intervention and child 
custody here.  Since custody disputes happen when a relationship is in the process of being dis-
solved through divorce, it is unlikely that a batterer's former victim would be interested in pursuing 
couples counseling if the relationship. 
 72. See Part IIIC, infra. 
 73. Tolman & Edleson, supra note 11, at 264. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Barry D. Rosenfield, Court-Ordered Treatment of Spouse Abuse, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 
205, 208 (1992). 
 76. Eric S. Mankowski et al., Collateral Damage: An Analysis of the Achievements and Unintended 
Consequences of Batterer Intervention Programs and Discourse, 17 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 167, 168 (2002). 
 77. Id. at 172. 
 78. Id. at 169. 
 79. Id. at 173. 
 80. Id. at 171. 
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one male and one female.81  Other groups vary in the number and gender of the 
group facilitators.82  State standards reflect a trend toward requiring group lead-
ers to have some kind of specialized training in domestic violence issues to lead 
a batterer’s group.83  Participants in such programs may voluntarily enroll or 
may be ordered by the court to complete batterer’s counseling.84 
B. What does it Take to “Successfully Complete” a Batterer’s Program? 
The requirements for successful completion of batterer’s treatment vary.  
Most states simply require attendance to earn a certificate of completion.85  Other 
states, however, require the batterer to be violence-free for a certain period of 
time or to “’take[] responsibility for [his] abuse.’”86  Since programs often rely 
heavily on self-reporting and victim’s reports to determine the violence-free 
status of abusers, the violence-free bar may not be much higher than the atten-
dance requirement.87  Program participants may also be terminated from the 
program for certain behaviors; the prohibited conduct may include continued 
abuse, failure to attend or participate in the sessions, or not paying program 
fees.88  All in all, not much is required from batterers; if they show up, pay their 
way, and manage to stay violence-free (or at least appear to be violence-free) for 
a certain (typically short) period of time, they will “graduate” from the program. 
C. Regulation of Batterer’s Groups 
Most states have promulgated standards that batterer’s programs either are 
required or encouraged to follow.89  The strictness and specificity of the stan-
dards vary widely.  Staff qualifications are fairly consistent from state to state; 
staff must be violence-free, should (or at least ideally should) have a profes-
sional degree or license, and must have training and experience in the domestic 
violence field.90  Most states limit the confidentiality of the groups by requiring 
that threats of violence be reported to the appropriate authorities.91  Standards 
also provide that batterers entering counseling should sign a written contract 
agreeing to attend the program and to end the violence, among other require-
ments.92  Some standards even specify required or recommended content, in-
cluding information about different types of abuse, the effects of abuse on 
 
 81. Id. at 170. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Juliet B. Austin & Juergan Dankwort, Standards for Batterer Programs: A Review and Analy-
sis, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 152, 153 (1999). 
 84. See Edward W. Gondolf, A Comparison of Four Batterer Intervention Systems: Do Court Referral, 
Program Length, and Services Matter?, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 41, 41-42, (1999) (comparing ef-
fectiveness of court-referral intervention programs in four cities). 
 85. Austin & Dankwort, supra note 83, at 165. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Part IV, infra. 
 88. Austin & Dankwort, supra note 83, at 165. 
 89. See id. at 154. 
 90. Id. at 160. 
 91. Id. at 161. 
 92. Id. at 162.  Other requirements include, being on time, waiving confidentiality when a part-
ner's safety is at stake, and not abusing alcohol or drugs.  Id. 
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women and children, taking responsibility for abusive behavior, and the harm-
ful attitudes and beliefs that perpetuate abuse.93 
Unfortunately, these standards are rarely derived from empirical evidence 
measuring their value.94  In addition, they are not often enforced, and when they 
are, their effectiveness is not often assessed.95  Thus, although state standards 
might look good on paper, they may be of little use in reality.  As will be seen in 
the next section, the effectiveness of current batterer’s programs is questionable; 
accordingly, these standards should be rethought or, at a minimum, enforced. 
IV.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BATTERER’S PROGRAMS:  
OUTCOME STUDIES AND THEIR DOWNFALLS 
Relatively few studies have tested the effectiveness of batterer’s programs, 
particularly in the last ten years.96  In addition, the existing studies often have 
several uncontrolled variables that could affect their accuracy.  This section first 
looks at the general findings of studies done in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Next, it examines some of the criticisms and downfalls of these studies.  Finally, 
it takes a closer look at a few studies conducted more recently. 
A. General Findings 
In a review of the research on batterer’s interventions, Richard Tolman and 
Jeffrey Edleson found that fifty-three to eighty-five percent of victims reported 
successful outcomes for their violent partners who had completed batterer’s 
programs.97  The follow-up period for these studies ranged from four to twenty-
six months and, as may be expected, the longer the follow-up period, the lower 
the success rate.98  Few studies compared one treatment method to another; 
however, those that did found higher success rates for structured group treat-
ment as opposed to less-structured, self-help treatment.99  Tolman and Edleson 
also highlighted the contradictory findings of the studies; some studies found 
that in comparison with untreated men, treated men displayed lower rates of re-
assault, while other studies arrived at the opposite conclusion—that treated men 
were more likely to reassault than untreated men.100 
A literature review by Barry Rosenfield casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
batterer’s treatment.101  Rosenfield not only looked at studies examining the ef-
 
 93. Id. at 163. 
 94. Id. at 167. 
 95. See id. 
 96. In a comprehensive 1992 literature review, Rosenfield identified twenty-five studies assess-
ing the effectiveness of batterer's programs, most of which were conducted in the late 1980's.  See 
Rosenfield, supra note 75.  A WebSPIRS (a social science database) search looking for post-1992 stud-
ies revealed only a small handful of studies conducted between 1992 and the present.  In addition, 
Tolman and Edleson found very few new studies in 1995 that had not been covered by Rosenfield.  
See Tolman & Edleson, supra note 11, at 269. 
 97. Tolman & Edleson, supra note 11, at 268. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 270. 
 100. See id. at 268-270. 
 101. See generally Rosenfield, supra note 75. 
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fectiveness of batterer’s interventions, but also reviewed studies examining the 
efficacy of various police responses to interspousal violence calls in reducing 
violence in the absence of an intervention program.102  He found that about a 
third of men who had abused their spouses or girlfriends stopped abusing their 
victims without any intervention whatsoever.103  Studies examining the effects of 
police interventions reported a reassault rate of less than thirty percent for all 
groups (that is, batterers who were arrested, batterers who were exposed to  
mediation techniques, and batterers who were forced to separate for a “cooling 
off” period).  Further, arrested individuals reassaulted at a rate of less than 
twenty percent at a six-month follow-up.104  In contrast, studies of men who had 
completed batterer’s programs revealed reassault rates averaging thirty-six per-
cent.105  Furthermore, in studies that compared treatment completers with treat-
ment dropouts, Rosenfield found that only one study found a significant de-
crease in reassault rates for those who completed treatment as compared to 
those who did not.106  While it is true that this comparison did not account for 
the differences between the samples in the different types of studies, this data 
still casts doubt on the effectiveness of treatment programs in curing batterers of 
their abusive behavior. 
B. Criticisms and Shortcomings 
Like any study involving human subjects facing real-world problems, stud-
ies of batterer’s interventions have their share of defects.  Among these prob-
lems are the questionable accuracy and representativeness of reassault data, the 
lack of random assignment and appropriate comparison populations, group 
make-up, and a wide variety of definitions for program success. 
1. Reassault Data 
Studies differ in their source of information for reassault data.  Some use 
police reports, others use self reports, and still others (perhaps the majority) use 
victim reports.107  As can be expected, reassault rates vary widely depending on 
the source of information used.  Studies exclusively relying on police reports 
show much lower reassault rates than studies using other sources of informa-
tion.108  Since police are probably not often called to intervene in interspousal 
violence incidents, this discrepancy is easily explained. 
A study by Alex Heckert and Edward Gondolf examined the difference be-
tween victim- and self-reports in the context of a batterer’s program.109  The 
 
 102. Id.  All of the studies discussed in this section relied on victims' reports of reassault.  The 
importance of this factor will be discussed later in Part IVB, infra. 
 103. Id. at 212.  Note, however, that the sample included men who had only assaulted their part-
ners once, and did not differentiate these men from men who had engaged in a pattern of abuse. 
 104. Id. at 214. 
 105. Id. at 215.  However, the results for these studies had reassault rates ranging from twelve to 
one hundred percent . 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 216-17. 
 108. See id. 
 109. D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Assessing Self-Reports by Batterer Program Participants 
and Their Partners, 15 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 181, 181 (2000). 
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study drew data from four batterer’s programs in various parts of the country.110  
Most of the participants were court-ordered into the treatment program.  Each 
program used a cognitive-behavioral model, and program lengths ranged from 
three to nine months.111  The follow-up period was twelve months and began at 
the same time as the program started.  Follow-up reports were obtained from 
both batterers and victims at three-month intervals.112 
First, the study compared the reports obtained upon intake of victims and 
batterers to each other and to narrative reports written by police called to the 
scene of an incident of interspousal violence.113  Surprisingly, women were sig-
nificantly more likely to deny the violence at this point than were men.114  How-
ever, men were significantly more likely to minimize the severity of the violence 
than were women.115  At follow-up, the denial effect was reversed.  Men were 
much more likely to deny a violent incident than were women at follow-up.116 
These findings suggest that studies relying on men’s self-reports of inter-
spousal violence might severely underestimate the rate of reassault.  Unfortu-
nately, there were no police reports with which to compare the follow-up data; 
therefore, the extent of the underestimation is unclear since the numbers give no 
insight into how often both partners were denying reassault.  Studies also typi-
cally experience high dropout rates at follow-up.117  Subjects who respond may 
be quite different than subjects who do not.  Logically, subjects who refuse tore-
spond may do so because they are experiencing reassault at rates higher than 
those who do respond.  Follow-up lengths also vary; since longer follow-up  pe-
riods are associated with higher rates of reassault, positive results seen in stud-
ies with short follow-up periods are suspect. 
2. Lack of Random Assignment and Appropriate Comparison Populations 
Random assignment is rarely seen in batterer’s treatment studies.  Certainly 
assigning one batterer to a treatment program and assigning the next to a no-
treatment control group may raise ethical concerns.  Nonetheless, lack of  ran-
dom assignment still reduces the validity of studies.  Rosenfeld reported that 
only three studies used random assignment to treatment conditions, but that 
steps were taken to assure the safety of victims of batterers in the waiting list 
condition, thus making the waiting list group less like a traditional control 
group and more like a minimal intervention group.118 
 
 110. Id. at 183-84.  The locations of the programs were Denver, Dallas, Pittsburgh and Houston. 
 111. Id. at 184. 
 112. Id. at 185.  If batterers were no longer with their original victims at follow-up and had begun 
a new relationship, data from the new significant other was used, if possible. 
 113. See id. at 185-87. 
 114. Id. at 189.  Women denied the violence twenty-nine percent of the time, whereas men only 
denied it nineteen percent of the time.  In addition, both individuals denied the violence in six per-
cent of the couples.  Sixty percent of the couples agreed that violence had occurred. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 190-91.  Almost eighty percent of the men whose significant others reported violence 
denied that any violent incident had occurred during the follow-up period. Id. 
 117. Rosenfeld, supra note 75, at 210. 
 118. Id. at 209. 
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Also, since many studies deal only with one treatment program, studies are 
not often able to use adequate comparison groups.  Often, treatment dropouts or 
rejects are compared to treatment completers, despite obvious differences be-
tween the groups.119  Unfortunately, few studies statistically control for these dif-
ferences.120 
3. Group Make-up 
Studies differ in the profile of participants, as well.  Some studies include 
only court-ordered subjects, while others include a mix of voluntary and court-
ordered participants.121  Subjects may also vary widely with respect to the extent 
of their history of abuse.122  More distressing, programs may reject candidates 
who appear particularly difficult to deal with because of substance abuse prob-
lems or mental health issues, thereby further limiting the applicability of effec-
tiveness findings to the general population of batterers.123 
4. Definitions of Program Success 
Studies also differ in the definition of program success.  Some studies con-
sider a program successful if reassault rates are reduced after batterers complete 
the program, whereas others only find success when violence has ceased com-
pletely during the follow-up period.124  In addition, emotional abuse is animpor-
tant, but perhaps overlooked, topic.125  Edward Gondolf, Alex Heckert, and Chad 
Kimmel specifically looked at nonphysical abuse in their 2002 study.126  During 
the follow-up period, over half of batterers exhibited controlling behavior, over 
three-fourths verbally abused their partner, and almost half threatened their 
partner.127  These high rates of emotional abuse indicate that more studies should 
look at this variable and at its effect on victims. Given the history between a vic-
tim and an abuser, emotional abuse, particularly the threat of violence, may be 
almost as harmful as physical abuse.128 
C. Outcome Studies 
This section looks at three very different recent studies of batterer’s inter-
vention programs.  Gondolf’s 1999 study129 is noteworthy because of its rela-
tively large sample size and comparison of programs of varying lengths.  Frank-
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 211. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Tolman & Edleson, supra note 11, at 265. 
 125. See id. at 266. 
 126. See generally Edward W. Gondolf et al., Nonphysical Abuse Among Batterer Program Partici-
pants, 17 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 293 (2002).  This study uses the same samples as the Heckert & Gondolf 
study discussed above, supra note 109. 
 127. Id. at 302.  It is unclear how many abusers did not emotionally abuse their partners at all 
during the follow-up period, although Gondolf, Heckert, and Kimmel reported that thirty-four per-
cent of the sample used all three types of emotional abuse. 
 128. Id. at 294. 
 129. See generally Gondolf, supra note 84. 
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lyn Dunford’s 2000 study compares a variety of different interventions.130  Fi-
nally, Julia Babcock and Ramalina Steiner’s 1999 study addresses Rosenfeld’s 
suggestion that there is little difference in reassault rates between batterers who 
are arrested and batterers who complete a treatment program.131 
1. Gondolf’s 1999 Study 
Gondolf’s study drew data from four batterer intervention sites employing 
a cognitive-behavioral approach: one in Pittsburgh, one in Denver, one in Dallas, 
and one in Houston.132  The Pittsburgh program was three months long and pro-
vided referrals to substance abuse programs when appropriate; its participants 
came from pretrial referrals.133  These men were subject to consistent monitoring 
by the court system, unlike participants in other programs.134  The Dallas pro-
gram lasted for three months and offered individual counseling and women’s 
groups in addition to the men’s group.  Most men in the Dallas program had 
been convicted of interspousal violence and were referred to the program by the 
court.135  The Denver program was nine months long, featured substance abuse 
treatment in addition to batterer’s treatment, provided individual counseling, 
including psychotherapy for mentally ill men, and also had services available 
for victims.136  Finally, the Houston program lasted six months, drew postconvic-
tion men, offered victim support groups, and made substance abuse referrals.137 
Most of the 840 participants in the study (eighty-two percent) were court-
referred.138  Participants at each site were similar in their history of abuse (both 
as aggressors and child witnesses), prior arrests, alcoholism, and relationship 
status.139  Reassault rates were based on interviews with the participant’s part-
ners: either the partner with whom the batterer associated at intake or a new 
partner if the batterer had ended the intake relationship.140  Female partners 
were interviewed for sixty-five percent of the subjects for at least nine of the fif-
teen follow-up months.141  Not surprisingly, the women participating in the fol-
low-up were more likely to be associated with a batterer who completed the 
program.142 
Reassault rates did not significantly differ from site to site, with the excep-
tion of the Denver program, which had significantly lower rates for severe reas-
 
 130. Franklyn W. Dunford, The San Diego Navy Experiment: An Assessment of Interventions for Men 
Who Assault Their Wives, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 468 (2000). 
 131. Julia C. Babcock & Ramalina Steiner, The Relationship Between Treatment, Incarceration, and 
Recidivism of Battering: A Program Evaluation of Seattle's Coordinated Community Response to Domestic 
Violence, 13 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 46 (1999). 
 132. Gondolf, supra note 84, at 44. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 45. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 44-45. 
 137. Id. at 45. 
 138. Id. at 46. 
 139. Id. at 50. 
 140. Id. at 47. 
 141. See id. at 48. 
 142. Id.  Batterers who completed at least three months worth of treatment were deemed to be 
program completers, even if they were a participant in the six- or nine-month programs. 
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saults.143  This result suggests that longer programs may not be cost efficient, 
since similar results can be achieved with a shorter program.  When looking 
only at treatment completers, the longer programs had significantly lower reas-
sault rates than the Pittsburgh program, but, as Gondolf points out, the Pitts-
burgh program’s close court monitoring of subjects may keep higher-risk men 
from dropping out.144  Overall, the general reassault rate for all subjects was 
thirty-two percent, and the reassault rate for program completers was twenty-
eight percent.145  However, these results must be interpreted with caution, since 
there was no control condition to compare with the men who enrolled in the 
programs. Additionally, the fifteen-month follow-up may not have been long 
enough to give an accurate picture of reassault rates—the follow-up only ex-
tended for a year after the shortest program and for only six months after the 
longest program.146 
2. Dunford’s 2000 Study 
Dunford’s study participants were married men on active duty in the Navy 
who had physically abused their wives and were referred to the program by 
their stations, a Navy Family Service Center, or a Navy medical facility.147  In or-
der to become a part of the study, potential subjects could not have significant 
substance abuse issues, mental impairments, or be going through divorce pro-
ceedings.  Study participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions.  
The first condition used a cognitive-behavioral approach for a men’s group that 
met weekly for the first six months and monthly for another six months.148  The 
second was a conjoint group that featured couples group counseling and met 
with the same frequency as the men’s group.  This group also used a cognitive-
behavioral approach.149  The third condition involved “rigorous monitoring;” 
under this condition, men received monthly individual counseling, their wives 
were contacted monthly and asked about any new incidents of abuse, and local 
court records were searched to see if any new incidents were being investigated 
by police.  After each counseling session, a progress report was sent to both the 
batterer and his commanding officer.150  Finally, the control group members  re-
ceived no formal treatment; however, it was not a true control group, since the 
victims were counseled in safety planning.151 
Reassault data were obtained from both victims and batterers at intake and 
then at six month intervals for the next year and a half—once mid-treatment, 
once immediately after treatment terminated, and once six months after treat-
ment terminated.152  Seventy-five percent of subjects participated in all of the fol-
low-up interviews; those who dropped out had, as a group, a higher degree of 
 
 143. Id. at 52. 
 144. Id. at 53. 
 145. Id. at 53-54. 
 146. See id. at 44, 47. 
 147. Dunford, supra note 130, at 469. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 470, 472. 
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prior abusiveness than those who submitted to the interviews.153  No significant 
demographic differences were found between participants across the four 
treatment conditions.154  The overall experiment dropout rate was twenty-nine 
percent; some dropouts voluntarily quit, while others were either discharged 
from the Navy, transferred elsewhere, or reassaulted and were assigned to a dif-
ferent treatment condition.155 
Overall, participants reassaulted at similar rates across all four conditions; 
about thirty percent of victims reported that they had been pushed or hit at the 
one-year follow-up.156  Women in the rigorous monitoring condition reported 
more violence than women in any of the other conditions, but the differences 
were not significant.157  The frequency of assault during each of the six-month 
periods after the study began was lower than the frequency of assault during the 
six-month period before treatment began, regardless of the condition to which 
the batterer was assigned.158  Also interesting is the finding that very few women 
participated in the conjoint therapy sessions and that the presence or absence of 
victims did not seem to have an effect on the effectiveness of the treatment;159 
however, had there been greater attendance, perhaps an impact would have 
been seen. 
This study suggests that batterer’s treatment is no more effective than  sim-
ply equipping victims with a safety plan.  However, the results must be inter-
preted with caution.  First, all of the participants were in the Navy and  referred 
to the program by the Navy.  It could be that all of the men were motivated not 
to reassault by a fear of adverse career consequences.  Also, since many men 
with other serious problems, such as substance abuse and mental illness, were 
excluded, the study may not be applicable to the general population of batterers.  
Finally, all of the men in the study were still married, so the study’s applicability 
to batterers trying to gain custody of their children in a divorce proceeding is 
somewhat limited.  Still, the study suggests that simply allowing time to pass 
may cause as many batterers to cease their abusive behavior as attending a bat-
terer’s program. 
3. Babcock and Steiner’s 1999 Study 
Participants in Babcock and Steiner’s study were all ordered by a court to 
attend batterer’s treatment.160  Subjects were placed into three different catego-
ries: program completers, program dropouts, and untreated but incarcerated in-
dividuals.161  Subjects were not randomly assigned to the three conditions; upon 
adjudication, some were ordered into a treatment program, while others were 
ordered to seek individual therapy, substance abuse treatment, or no treatment 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 471. 
 156. Id. at 473. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 471. 
 160. Babcock & Steiner, supra note 131, at 49. 
 161. Id. Completion was defined as attendance at twenty-four or more sessions.  Id. at 50. 
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at all.162  Those in the program completers condition had significantly less prior 
criminal involvement than did program noncompleters, and program noncom-
pleters in turn had significantly less prior criminal involvement than incarcer-
ated batterers.163  In addition, treatment completers were significantly more 
likely to be first time interspousal violence offenders, have more education, be 
employed, make a higher monthly salary, and not be a member of a minority 
group.164  However, there were no significant differences between the three 
groups in probation officer ratings of anger, cooperativeness, and taking respon-
sibility for violence.165 
Batterers who participated in treatment programs obtained treatment at 
one of eleven sites, all governed by Washington state standards.166  The pro-
grams were all twelve months long, with six months of weekly sessions  fol-
lowed by six months of monthly sessions, and used a combination of cognitive-
behavioral and profeminist techniques.167  Measures of reassault were based on 
police records for two years after the initial accident.168 
Not surprisingly, program completers were rearrested significantly less of-
ten than program noncompleters and incarcerated individuals.169  When demo-
graphic and prior record differences were controlled for, the difference was still 
significant, but not as dramatically so.170  Treatment completion accounted for 
only five percent of the variance in recidivism.171 
There are some notable limitations of this study.  First, relying solely on ar-
rest as a measure of reassault likely leads to an underestimation of reassault.  
Second, the lack of random assignment also skewed the results—the incarcer-
ated batterers had much lengthier prior arrest records and may not have been 
ordered into treatment because a judge saw them as likely to be treatment resis-
tant.  An interesting follow up to this study would look at how many of these 
incarcerated individuals had been court-ordered into treatment in the past, since 
they clearly had histories of interspousal violence offenses—looking at this in-
formation might give an indication of the longer term effects of treatment.  This 
study is still valuable, however, in that it partly refutes Rosenfeld’s assertion 
that there is no difference in reassault rates between men who are simply ar-
rested and men who complete treatment. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Little weight should be given to completion of a batterer’s program in cus-
tody decisions without requiring additional proof of rehabilitation from the bat-
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terer.  The studies above highlight the uncertainty of treatment effectiveness.172  
As both victims and children are at risk when exposed to interspousal violence, 
courts must put the safety and well-being of the victims and children above the 
parental interests of the batterers.  Thus, if batterer’s intervention completion is 
the only evidence that a batterer has been reformed, it would be foolish to give 
undue weight to this factor, given that studies show that completion is no guar-
antee that the batterer is actually “cured.” 
When viewing evidence of treatment completion, then, courts should exer-
cise extreme caution and take a close look at the batterer’s reassault rate after 
treatment and the amount of time that has passed since treatment completion.  
Courts that order treatment as a contingency for greater visitation and custody 
rights should require more than just treatment completion, perhaps a waiting 
period after treatment completion to assess reassault or a probationary period of 
only supervised visitation. 
The Louisiana approach of requiring batterer’s intervention, substance 
abuse treatment, and a best interests showing before batterers can even get su-
pervised visitation (and much more—that the best interests of the child “re-
quire” visitation—in order to get joint or sole custody)173 gives treatment comple-
tion appropriate weight.  Such an approach would hopefully weed out those 
men who only fought for custody or visitation in order to retain control over 
their wives and families—in other words, men who do not sincerely want to 
visit their children may be less likely to actually complete treatment.  Hopefully, 
as greater efforts are made to educate judges and lawmakers about the dynam-
ics of interspousal violence and its effect on children, the natural result of such 
education will lead to greater skepticism in viewing evidence of batterer’s inter-
vention completion. 
 
 172. Quite a few studies examining the effectiveness of batterer's interventions involve subjects 
who were ordered by a court to complete a batterer's program after conviction for an interspousal 
violence charge.  See Rosenfeld, supra note 96, at 216-17.  Most seem to have been still making an ef-
fort to remain in their original relationship, based on victim reports of violence used for outcome 
assessments.  See id.  More research should be done with subjects undergoing treatment because of 
an attempt to gain custody and/or with subjects who are going through a divorce before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn about the role of batterer's interventions in custody decisions.  The moti-
vation of gaining visitation or custody rights may be enough to yield more positive treatment out-
comes. But see D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, The Effect of Perceptions of Sanctions on Batterer 
Program Outcomes, 37 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 369 (2000) (finding that men who thought arrest or 
jail was likely as a sanction for reassault or failure to complete a treatment program were just as apt 
to drop out of treatment or reassault as men who viewed the danger of such outcomes as remote).  
Perhaps the father-child bond is strong enough to make a difference, however. Until such research is 
completed, however, the potential danger to children of placing them with an interspousal abuser 
must outweigh evidence of treatment completion alone. 
 173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2003).  The ALI's primary caretaker approach might also 
ease the victimization of battered women through custody disputes, as noted above.  See Part I, su-
pra. 
